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Enlarging the EMU to the East: What Effects on Trade?
*
 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the implications of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) accession of eight Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) on their share in 
EMU-12 imports. Overcoming biases related to endogeneity, omitted variables and sample 
selection, our results indicate that the common currency has boosted intra-EMU imports by 
7%. Under the assumption that the same relationship between the explanatory variables and 
imports will hold for EMU-CEEC trade, we are able to predict the future impact of the Euro. 
Our findings suggest that except for the least integrated countries, Poland, Latvia and 
Lithuania, all CEECs can expect increases in the EMU-12 import share. 
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As a result of the European Commission’s convergence report in May 2006, 
Slovenia was the first of the new European Union (EU) member states to 
adopt the Euro. Other countries will follow in the course of the upcoming 
years. While research of exchange rate regimes traditionally focused on its 
consequences for the macroeconomic performance of countries (see Ghosh, 
Gulde and Wolf, 2002 for an exhaustive overview), a more recent line of 
research draws attention to the real impacts of exchange rate issues (e.g. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992 and 1998 and Frankel and Rose, 1998 for the 
effects on business cycle synchronization and Belke and Gros, 2002 and 
Belke and Setzer, 2003 for labour market effects). In a controversial but 
highly influential paper, Rose (2000) assessed the contribution of currency 
unions in promoting international trade. His point estimate of a 3.35 times 
higher trade volume with a common currency compared to the baseline 
scenario without a common currency has been subject to much critique. In a 
recent paper, Baldwin (2006a) summarizes follow-up studies and specifically 
points his critique to possible estimation biases related to omitted variables, 
endogeneity and sample selection.  
Among the numerous papers trying to reduce the “Rose effect”, a few 
dealt explicitly with the Euro area. The first studies by Micco, Stein and 
Ordoñez (2002) and Flam and Nordstrom (2006) estimate respectively 6% and 
8% more trade among Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) members 
compared to other EU member states.
1 Controlling for the general trend of 
greater economic integration among the Euro area countries over the past five 
decades, Berger and Nitsch (2005) find the EMU effect even disappearing -2- 
 
completely. In the most recent study, Bun and Klaassen (2007) introduce a 
time trend and estimate a Euro effect of only 3%.  
However, there are very few authors that point to the trade effects of 
the forthcoming EMU enlargement.
2 While trade barriers between the old and 
new EU member states had already been removed during the 1990s
3, sharing a 
common currency may further deepen real economic integration – directly 
through reduced trade costs and indirectly through intensified competition 
due to the enhanced price transparency. The question whether these changes 
have indeed led to an additional geographical restructuring of trade flows, 
involving trade creation and trade diversion, is however, an empirical one. 
Empirical findings on intra-EMU trade effects of the introduction of the Euro 
by the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)
4 are of high interest 
for politicians and for researchers in the field of Optimum Currency Areas 
(OCAs) at least for two reasons: First, they may have important policy 
implications. If a common currency boosts trade even among highly 
integrated regions, currency unions become more attractive, and hence, 
European Central Bank (ECB) and government authorities may encourage 
applicants to execute all necessary steps for an early adoption of the Euro.
5 
Second, any increase in Euro area trade resulting from an EMU enlargement 
provides empirical support for Rose’s finding that establishing a common 
currency stimulates trade among union members substantially. 
We start this study by applying a specification that accounts for recent 
insights into the theoretical foundation as well as the appropriate econometric 
set-up of gravity models. While earlier studies only use time-invariant 
country pair fixed effects to address the price terms, as emphasized by 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), we correct for the remaining omitted -3- 
 
variable bias by also incorporating time-variant multilateral resistance to 
trade. As suggested by Egger (2002) and Carrère (2006), we apply the 
Hausman-Taylor (HT) instrumental variables estimator to account for any 
possible endogeneity of Right Hand Side (RHS) variables, and specifically 
the EMU dummy. Further, we use the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition 
(FEVD) estimator developed by Plümper and Troeger (2007), which has – to 
our knowledge – hardly been applied before in the context of gravity 
modelling. Both techniques have the great advantage of allowing for an 
estimation of the traditional time-invariant gravity variables, such as distance 
and language while controlling for the unobserved individual effects in an 
efficient way.  
Based on our estimates of the early impact of the Euro on intra-EMU 
imports, we aim to assess the implications of the EMU accession of eight 
CEECs on their share in the twelve Euro area member states’ imports as of 
end-of-year 2004. Assuming that the same relationship between income, 
distance, common borders and other country characteristics and bilateral trade 
will hold for future EMU member states, we calculate the potential import 
increases following the accession of the CEECs to the Euro area. Our 
predictions based on the parameters estimated out-of-sample suggest that 
except for the least integrated countries Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, all 
CEECs can expect further gains in the EMU-12 import share once they adopt 
the Euro.  
After developing some stylized facts and linking them to the 
predictions of the OCA theory in section 2, we continue with the specification 
of the gravity equation we are going to test (section 3). The description of the 
applied econometric methods and the data set (section 4) is followed by the -4- 
 
interpretation of the estimation results in section 5.1. The trade predictions 
for an enlargement of the Euro area are assessed in section 5.2. Section 6 
contains a summary as well as policy implications of the obtained results.   
 
 
II DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE FLOWS AND THE ROLE OF 
MONETARY INTEGRATION 
 
2.1 Stylized facts 
 
We start with some stylized facts concerning trade flows between the Euro 
area and the Central and Eastern European EU member countries. For this 
purpose, Figure 1 plots the EMU-12 and the EU-15 imports from the CEECs 
between 1991 and 2004. The figure conveys first empirical evidence of a 
parallel increase in the import values of the EU-15 and the EMU-12 from the 
CEECs over the past 15 years.
6
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
While there has been a steady rise in the import value over the 1990s, 
one can observe a higher growth rate imminently prior to the EU accession of 
the eight CEECs.  
Even though most obstacles to free trade have been fully removed, 
sharing a single currency may stimulate real integration further through 
various channels (see section 2.2). A simple calculation helps to portray the 
relative change in intra-EMU trade and intra-EU trade. To render the sizes of -5- 
 
the two geographical regions comparable, the respective yearly import values 
have been normalized with regard to the base year (1997). Taking the quotient 
allows then to assess relative changes. To be precise, the development of 
intra-EMU imports ( ) and intra-EU imports ( ) since 1997 has been 
calculated as follows: 










                                                (1) 
 
Looking at Figure 2, it can be readily seen that the increase of intra-
EMU imports has been over 5% higher than the rise of intra-EU imports 
during the same period. After an initial slowdown in 1999, the EMU 
experienced an especially strong relative increment in 2001, when Greece 
entered the currency union, and in 2003. The graph also suggests an 
announcement effect, since intra-EMU imports already increased relative to 
intra-EU imports in the two years before the formal adoption of the common 
currency. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
The crude figure seems to roughly confirm prior studies which provide 
estimates mostly in the range of 5 to 10% (Baldwin, 2006a). However, the 
graph also shows that it is crucial to include the most recent year available, 
since much of the increase in imports only occurred since 2002. 
Seen on the whole, the stylized facts match our a priori expectations 
well. While the imports of the EU-15 and the Euro area from the CEECs have -6- 
 
developed synchronously up to now, those EU member states that share a 
common currency seem to trade relatively more with each other than with 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK. This result at the outset argues in favour of a 
similar development in case of the EMU accession of the CEECs, thus calling 
for a more formal investigation. 
 
2.2 Optimum Currency Areas and Trade 
 
The theoretical question whether a single currency is beneficial for the 
participating countries dates back to Mundell (1961).
7 On the one hand, he 
proposed that a single medium of exchange should reduce transaction costs 
and thereby facilitate international trade. On the other hand, Mundell (1961) 
also stated that a single currency may be problematic in case of coexisting 
asymmetric shocks and nominal rigidities. He suggested therefore perfect 
labour mobility as an indispensable condition to lower the stability losses 
associated with giving up monetary independence. Mundell himself 
challenged his early proposal of a small currency union by introducing the 
foreign exchange market and international risk sharing (Mundell, 1973). In 
his later model this means that the more countries are involved, the better 
they can mitigate shocks by reserve pooling and portfolio diversification. 
There are, consequently, theoretical arguments speaking in favour of an 
enlargement of the Euro area.
8 McKinnon (1963) specifically suggested small 
open economies to be suitable candidates for currency unions.  
Based on the Euro area imports over the CEECs’ GDP ratio, Figure 3 
gives a visual impression of the degree of Euro area openness of the CEECs 
in the year 2004. In accordance to the mentioned arguments, the Czech -7- 
 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary should benefit most from their individual 
EMU accession since the Euro area displays a high trade exposure towards 
them. However, the seminal study by Frankel and Rose (1998) challenged the 
OCA textbook view by stressing the possibility of endogenous currency 
unions. They argue that two countries would move even closer to match the 
OCA criteria once they share a common currency. There are several 
transmission mechanisms that can spur this effect: In addition to the 
traditional trade cost reduction, the efficiency gains studied within the OCA 
framework also include higher price transparency that stimulates competition 
and eventually leads to higher trade volumes. Finally, one may argue that the 
EMU and its pro-competitive effects have served as a catalyst for structural 
reforms.
9 The cost savings related to monetary integration can be viewed like 
any other reduction of bilateral non-tariff trade barriers. Changes in intra- 
and extra-EMU trade should therefore be interpreted against the background 
of trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation implies that lower cost 
suppliers inside the currency union substitute higher cost domestic producers 
as a result of diminished trade costs. Trade diversion takes place when low 
cost suppliers outside the currency union are replaced by higher cost Euro 
area producers (Viner, 1950). 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
In accordance to the possible ex-post trade effects of currency unions, 
it seems equally apt to argue a priori that the rise of imports due to the Euro 
adoption is expected to be higher for countries that have not yet exploited 
their full trade potential with the current EMU member states. Based on this -8- 
 
different variant of OCA theory, Figure 3 indicates that Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland were in 2004 relatively less open towards trading with the EMU-12 
and may therefore expect a bigger trade effect from the Euro. Which view is 




III EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 
To disentangle the effects of a single currency from other factors influencing 
trade flows, we estimate a log-linearised reduced-form gravity equation for 
country i’s imports from country j ( ) of the form   ijt M
 
ijt ij ij ijt jt it ijt EMU Z d re Y Y M 6 5 4 3 2 1 ln ln ln ln ln β β β β β β α + + + + + + =
    
  ijt ijt ij ij ijt avEMU avZ avd avre ε β β β β + + + + + 10 9 8 7 ln ln                         (2) 
 
where   is the importer’s GDP influencing its import demand,   is the 
exporter’s GDP influencing its export supply.
it Y jt Y
10   stands for the real 
exchange rate and allows us to control for changes in the value of the 
currency which induce expenditure shifts not directly attributable to the 
EMU.
ijt re
11  , the great-circle distance between the importing and the exporting 
country, is generally used as a proxy for transportation costs.   represents a 
set of dummy variables serving as proxies for additional trade costs. To be 
precise, we consider whether country i or j are landlocked (ll) and whether 




facilitating trade. By including dummies for EU and Europe Agreement (EA) 
participation, we additionally control for integration efforts other than 
monetary integration.
12  
Finally,    represents a dummy variable measuring the intra-EMU 
trade effects of the single currency. Specifically, the variable captures all 
transaction cost savings due to the eliminated exchange rate uncertainty, thus, 
the removed need for exchange controls, foreign exchange transactions and 
currency hedging. It additionally picks up the lower mark-ups suppliers are 
expected to set because of increased competition and higher price 
transparency. As in the trade liberalisation literature, these savings may lead 
to trade creation inside the currency union. Therefore,   is defined to 
take the value of 1 for both countries of a trading pair being EMU members 
and 0 otherwise. We set this variable in the first set of regressions (Table 1) – 
accounting also for a possible announcement effect – over the period 1998-
2004. In the second set of regressions (Table 2), we introduce yearly EMU 




As stated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), bilateral trade does not 
solely depend on bilateral trade costs, but also on the average resistance to 
trade with the Rest of the World (ROW). To account for this finding, we 
introduce the correspondent multilateral term to all variables that facilitate or 
hamper bilateral trade. To be precise, multilateral resistance (MR) is given by 
the sum of average bilateral resistances (BR) of countries i (j) towards all 
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Since the   variable is supposed to capture the trade effects of 
the common currency on outside countries, it is set to 0 for all EMU member 
states. If the saved transaction costs of the single currency can be seen like a 
discriminatory liberalisation of trade, it involves a trade-diverting switch of 
supply sources – like in any other Preferential Trade Arrangement (PTA). 
ijt avEMU
The parameter coefficients of the multilateral trade cost variables are 
expected to take the opposite sign of their bilateral counterparts. Hence, the 
bigger a trading pair’s joint resistance to trade with the ROW, the lower the 
bilateral trade costs relative to the multilateral trade costs and the larger 
country i’s imports from country j.  
For the   this means, that holding the bilateral real exchange rate 
between country i and country j constant, a depreciation of country i’s 
currency with respect to all other currencies in the sample, pushes country i 
to import from country j.
ijt avre
13 Since a part of the multilateral variables does not 
only change cross-sectionally but also over time (e.g. the average exchange 
rate), we are able to remove biases present in studies that only include 
country (pair) fixed effects to describe Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) 
price terms. To summarize, the expected coefficient signs are   
. 0 , 0 , 0 , 0
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Finally, we overcome a possible selection bias by including three 
variables that approximate the Heckman correction term: HC1 is a variable -11- 
 
containing the number of years of a trading pair in the sample. HC2 and HC3 
are dummies, taking the value of 1 if the trading pair is observed over the 
entire period 1991 to 2004 and if the trading pair is present in the sample in t-
1, respectively (and 0 otherwise).  By this, we leave ample room within the 
estimation for the basic insight that a great number of bilateral trade 
relationships are not utilized, meaning that they involve no trade (the so-
called extensive margin of trade, Felbermayr and Kohler, 2007). 
 
    
IV ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
The estimations are based on a panel data set containing all countries being 
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) over the period 1991 to 2004 – including also those CEECs which 
have already joined (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) – 
plus Romania and Bulgaria and the four CEECs (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Slovenia) that have not yet become full OECD members.  
The advantages of using panel data in the context of this study are 
straightforward. They allow capturing relevant relationships between 
variables over time and monitoring unobservable country pair individual 
effects. Cheng and Wall (2004) demonstrate that not controlling for country 
pair heterogeneity yields biased estimates. The country pair effects will be 
treated as fixed, since the Random Effects (RE) model only yields consistent 
estimates when the unobservable bilateral effects are not correlated with the 
error term. The conducted Hausman test, however, rejected the null-
hypothesis of no correlation. The relevant Fixed Effects (FE) regression thus -12- 
 
gives unbiased estimates of the time-varying variables (reported in column 2 
of Table 1 and 2). The first drawback of this procedure is well-known: Since 
the within-groups estimator ignores the between-groups variance, estimates 
for the time-invariant explanatory variables cannot be provided. Only very 
recently, researchers have started discussing a second drawback: Although 
coefficients are provided for variables that are hardly changing over time, the 
FE absorbs most of their explanatory power and estimates of these variables 
become inefficient (Plümper and Troeger, 2007). A third problem is related to 
the possible endogeneity of preferential arrangements. Thinking in terms of 
the traditional OCA theory, this reasoning may hold for monetary 
arrangements even more than for trade arrangements. Fearing the loss of the 
exchange rate and an autonomous monetary policy as tools to respond to 
external shocks, policy makers might only select into a currency union when 
the level of integration (here reflected by the level of imports) is already high 
beforehand. We address these problems via two estimation techniques we 
apply in addition to the FE estimator. Both, the FEVD estimator and the HT 
estimator, (reported in columns 3 and 4 of both tables, respectively) allow for 
an estimation of time-invariant (e.g. distance) and almost time-invariant 
variables (e.g. the EMU dummy).
14 The FEVD estimator further explicitly 
addresses the problem of inefficiency. The HT estimator is an instrumental 
variable panel estimator capable to correct for any bias caused by the 
mentioned reverse causality. To provide comparability to earlier studies, we 
also report the results of the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) 
regression in column 1 of both tables. We corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation in all regressions. The Dickey-Fuller test rejects the null 






5.1 Trade effects of the Euro  
 
The outputs from the regressions on the full country sample are displayed in 
Table 1. The estimates in columns (3) and (4) are consistent and efficient, so 
we refer to them when interpreting the results. In the FEVD estimation all 
coefficients except for the bilateral real exchange rate and the multilateral 
landlocked and border variable, show the expected sign and are highly 
significant. The HT estimator turns, once the correlation between the 
regressors and the unobservable country pair effects is properly 
accommodated, the coefficients of some of the time-invariant variables 
(specifically, the bilateral border, landlocked, common language, EU and the 
multilateral common language and EA variable) insignificant.
15  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The estimates of the traditional gravity variables GDP and distance lie within 
the usual range.
16 While a 10% rise in bilateral distance lowers imports by 
14.1% (17.5% in the HT estimation), the same increase in multilateral 
distance (or remoteness) induces country i to import 9.3% more from a certain 
trading partner j (14.5% in the HT estimation). The unexpected positive sign 
of the bilateral real exchange rate may be due to temporarily irreversible 
import contracts and reflect a J-curve effect. This effect does not seem to be -14- 
 
important on a multilateral basis. A 10% depreciation of country i’s currency 
against all but country j’s currency pushes it to import from country j 4.5% 
more. The other multilateral counterparts of the bilateral variables are in the 
FEVD regression also significant at the 1%-level and indicate hence, their 
relevance for the gravity estimation. Our consistent EMU estimate indicates 
7% more imports attributable to savings in transaction costs and lower mark-
ups. The result is very well in line with our preliminary analysis (compare 
Figure 2) and amidst the range of estimates found in other post-Rose studies. 
Bun and Klaasen’s (2007) preferred estimate suggests a Euro effect of only 
3%. Their use of time-varying trading pair dummies makes it, however, 
“impossible to estimate factors that affect bilateral trade costs even if they 
are time varying”. (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006, p 23). Indeed, the Euro 
estimate jumps up to 6% when the authors employ country-specific time-
varying dummies, suggesting that the pair dummies absorb at least some of 
the variation of the EMU variable. We believe our result also to be reliable 
with an eye on the fact that the inclusion of multilateral variables enables us 
to remove not only the time-invariant part of the omitted variable bias, but to 
address additionally the time-varying character of the Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) relative price terms. Interestingly enough, the significantly 
positive multilateral EMU estimate indicates that the common currency did 
not divert trade from non-members – on the contrary, outside countries highly 
profited from trading with the currency bloc. This result does not come 
unexpectedly. Many of the empirical studies, among those Baldwin and Di 
Nino (2006) and Baldwin (2006b), also find significant pro-trade effects of a 
unilateral Euro usage. The empirical evidence suggests therefore that the 
EMU has so far acted rather like a unilateral than a preferential -15- 
 
liberalisation.
17 This finding contradicts the OCA theory insofar as the latter 
asks a country to give up its monetary autonomy to be able to benefit from the 
efficiency gains in a currency union (see section 2.2). If countries can, 
however, get better market access without sacrificing their main 
macroeconomic tool than the UK and Denmark took the right decision voting 
against EMU membership. This may have important policy implications for 
the CEECs as well, even though they do not have the possibility to opt-out. 
Turning to the regression results with yearly EMU dummies (Table 2), 
one can readily see the robustness of the coefficient estimates.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Both, the FEVD and the HT estimator confirm the presumption of an 
announcement effect. In 1998, the prospect of a common currency has already 
boosted intra-EMU-12 imports by 8%. The results further suggest a positive 
impact of the Euro across all years until 2002, with the strongest effect on 
trade in 2001, the year Greece entered the currency union and one year before 
the physical notes and coins were introduced. In contrast to the descriptive 
statistics graphed in Figure 2, our formal econometric analysis shows that the 
Euro did not stimulate trade significantly further since 2003. On the contrary, 
the FEVD estimator even yields significant coefficients indicating a negative 
impact of the Euro in last two sample periods. The observation of no further 
gains for member countries in 2003 and 2004 suggests that the Euro’s trade 
creating potential has already been fully exploited.
18 Further efficiency gains 
may be realised with the accession of new member states.  
 -16- 
 
5.2 Trade effects of the Euro area enlargement 
 
When calculating predictions, two approaches can be distinguished: In in-
sample predictions the countries under consideration, thus the CEECs, are 
included in the regression. This approach is appropriate when the parameters 
of the CEECs do not substantially differ from those of the other OECD 
member states. The method has, however, been subject to critique by Egger 
(2002) who states that systematic differences between predicted and observed 
trade flows are likely due to a misspecification of the model. An alternative 
are out-of-sample predictions, where the countries under consideration are 
left out when fitting the model. This approach seems justified when the 
parameters of the two country samples differ and was for that reason 
frequently used at the early stages of transition. Methods using FE bear 
limitations when it comes to the calculation of out-of-sample trade flow 
predictions. Much information needed to predict accurately EMU imports 
from the CEECs is contained in the country pair specific terms. The 
determination of this term for the countries not included in the sample when 
fitting the model is arbitrary. This problem can be circumvented applying the 
HT estimator. In order to predict the impact of EMU accession for the CEECs 
based on the full sample as well as out-of-sample, two scenarios are 
constructed and investigated over the timeframe 1991-2004: In the baseline 
scenario we predict the EMU-12 imports from the CEECs in a world without 
the Euro. In the counterfactual scenario, we base our import predictions on 
the estimated model controlling for the EMU. For measuring the EMU impact 
correctly, a few adjustments have to be made: In the counterfactual scenario, 
the bilateral and the multilateral EMU variables take the value of 1 and 0, -17- 
 
respectively. In addition to this, we adjust the real exchange rate variable, 
such that from the time of the Euro adoption only real changes are allowed 
whereas the nominal exchange rate is held constant. Under the assumption 
that the same relation between the explanatory variables and imports will hold 
also for future EMU members, we take the coefficients from the fitted model 
and apply these to the CEEC dataset. To be precise, by using the saved 
parameter estimates from the full country sample (columns one and two in 
Table 3) and from the country sample excluding the CEECs (columns three 
and four in Table 3) and combining these with the observations on the 
CEECs, we obtain the corresponding values for the import variable. 
Comparing the 2004 forecasts on EMU-12 imports of the baseline (without 
Euro) with the counterfactual scenario (with Euro), we obtain a prediction of 
the extent to which a future EMU accession of the CEECs will further 
stimulate trade.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the calculation of the impact of the Euro 
introduction in eight CEECs. The figures represent the additional cumulative 
EMU-12 imports from them. The full sample estimation indicates that EMU 
membership will boost EMU-12 imports from four CEECs beyond the level 
attained through their EU accession – Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia 
cannot expect further gains when adopting the Euro.
19 Given the results for 
the multilateral EMU dummy variable of Table 1 and 2, the relative low or 
even negative impact of the Euro adoption for some countries does not come 
surprisingly. Since trade was not diverted from third countries – on the -18- 
 
contrary, they benefited even more from the common currency area – the 
passage to full EMU membership may in this setting have a negative effect on 
their performance.  
Although the discussed points of critique on in-sample and out-of-
sample approaches limit the detail of the conclusions, the out-of-sample 
results (i.e., those based on parameter estimates gained from a country sample 
which does not include the CEECs) head in the same direction as the full 
sample estimation. Only Slovakia is additionally found to benefit from the 
Euro adoption through an 11% gain in EMU-12 imports. The overall 
performance of the CEECs is also slightly better: While the simple average of 
the out-of-sample estimates yields a gain in EMU-12 imports of 12.7%, the 
full sample calculation predicts only a 1.8% increase on average.
20 The trade-
weighted averages report a slightly lower Euro effect of 12.4% and -2.8% for 
the out-of-sample and the full sample calculations, respectively.
21 The results 
for Austria broadly confirm the aggregate findings (Table A.3). The finding 
that countries with a higher share in EMU-12 imports have to settle with a 
lower Euro effect may at first sight contradict the old OCA theory; however, 
one has to keep in mind that trade integration should be related to country 
size as done in Figure 2.  
Table 3 gives some intuition with respect to the hypothesis that the 
EMU impact is higher for well-integrated economies. The negative prediction 
for the less-open Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian economies in both 
regressions clearly speaks in favor of the classical OCA theory. In contrast, 
the simulation results for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the countries with 
the highest imports over GDP ratios reveal a relatively low EMU impact and 
strengthen, therefore, the validity of the OCA endogeneity hypothesis -19- 
 
(compare Figure 3). To elucidate this further, we also investigated the issue 
on a more formal level. For this purpose, we conducted a Spearman rank 
correlation analysis of the relation between the ranking of the CEECs 
concerning trade openness in 2004 and the ranking of these countries with 
respect to their fictitious gains from adopting the Euro in 2004 (Table 4).  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
For both, the full country sample and the out-of-sample scenario, there 
is no significant relationship. Only by calculating the rank correlation 
coefficient over the entire time span (1991-2004), we find a significantly 
positive relation between the CEECs’ openness and their gain in the EMU’s 
import share. Hence, there is some evidence that a high degree of openness 
beforehand determines a positive trade impact of EMU membership. This 
result does not only give support to the traditional OCA theory, but also has 
important implications for the timing of the CEECs accession to the Euro 
area. While the open economies should opt for an early introduction of the 
single currency, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania may prefer to concentrate first 





This paper’s motivation has been twofold: First, we attempted to address all 
the commonly accepted mistakes in gravity estimation to obtain unbiased 
currency effects on trade. Using the HT estimator we took into account the -20- 
 
possibility of reverse causality between membership in a currency bloc and 
the import value. By including multilateral time-variant variables we 
corrected for the omitted variable bias present in earlier studies that only rely 
on country pair fixed effects. Finally, with the proxies for the Heckman 
correction term, we addressed the possibility of selection bias. With this 
specification, we obtain a point estimate for the EMU dummy of 0.07, much 
lower than Rose’s result but well in line with Micco, Stein and Ordoñez 
(2002) and Flam and Nordstrom (2006). Second, we would like to argue that 
our procedure allows deriving some policy implications. As the yearly EMU 
estimates for 2003 and 2004 indicate that the Euro did not contribute to any 
increase in imports in these years, it seems that the EMU-12 has already 
exhausted its trade-creating potential. The important announcement effects by 
now seem to be consumed to a large extent without much further gains to be 
expected. For the EMU candidates, it might be worthwhile to note that these 
announcement effects could also be reversed again if EMU membership would 
suddenly not be implemented. On the one hand, this fact may deliver an 
argument for current members to opt for a quick entry of the CEECs, once 
they have fulfilled the Maastricht criteria, although their importance for the 
EMU-12 is by far lower than the other way around. On the other hand, the 
Spearman rank correlation suggests that gains from EMU membership are 
larger if the openness towards the Euro area has been substantial beforehand. 
The predictions finally indicate that the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, 
Hungary (and Slovakia in the out-of-sample estimation) can expect further 
gains in the EMU-12 import share once they adopt the Euro. Therefore, these 
countries, too, may put efforts to fulfill the accession criteria in the near 
future. The fact that outside countries even benefit more from trading with a -21- 
 
currency union suggests that the less-open economies, Poland, Latvia and 
Lithuania may do better not entering the EMU in the near future.  
One task that we have left open for further investigation is the role of 
exchange rate volatility in this kind of models. By implementing a variable 
measuring exchange rate volatility one could control for the exchange rate 





















1 In this study, we use the terms EMU and Euro area as substitutes and refer throughout 
the paper to the twelve EMU member states that have introduced the common currency in 
1999 and 2001. 
2 We are only aware of the studies by Maliszewska (2004) and Brouwer, van Dijk and 
Viaene (2007) dealing with this issue empirically. 
3 Trade and trade-related measures were given effective by means of the Interim 
Agreements (IAs), ratified between 1992 and 1995. The asymmetric tariff policy implied 
that the EU’s import tariffs against the CEECs were eliminated by 1997, whereas the 
CEECs had to follow only in 2002.  
4 In this paper, we conceive the CEECs as the group formed by the Baltic States (Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania), Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
5 Breuss, Fink and Haiss (2004) discuss the desirability of an enlargement of the EMU to 
the East in the context of different interpretations of the OCA theory. 
6 Clearly, the EMU-12 is much more important for the CEECs than the other way around. 
Due to restrictions concerning the availability of trade data, we are constrained to look at 
EMU-12 imports from the CEECs. 
7 For a comprehensive discussion, please see Breuss, Fink and Haiss (2004) and Gros and 
Thygesen (1998). 
8 Another strand of arguments points towards the importance of institutional quality. 
Alesina and Barro (2002) show that countries select into currency unions in order to 
facilitate trade when participation allows them to upgrade the quality of their monetary 
institutions.  
9 Although there is no obvious link from monetary to institutional integration, one may 
argue that the commitment shown by adopting a common currency may have signaling 
effects towards greater harmonization also in other areas. 
10 See Table A.1 for variable definitions and sources. 
11 A rise in the real exchange rate implies a depreciation of country i’s currency against 
country j’s currency and lowers therefore its import demand. 
12 The multilateral counterparts of these two variables are defined in the same way as the 
average EMU dummy. -23- 
 
 
13 Since taking the sum of the average exchange rates of both trading partners would have 
offsetting effects, we consider in this case simply the average exchange rate of country i 
towards all trading partners except the particular trading partner j.   
14 Please find a detailed description of the estimators in the appendix A.2. 
15 Among others, Egger (2002) finds a similar effect when applying the HT estimator. 
16 As stated by Anderson (1979), GDP estimates may slightly differ from the theoretically 
predicted unitary elasticity due to the existence of non-tradeable goods. 
17 Transitory factors, like the appreciation of the Euro since 2002 or the relative strength 
of the US and some of the Eastern and Asian economies help explaining why imports from 
outside the Euro area have even grown faster than intra-EMU imports over the underlying 
timeframe, but should already be captured by the exchange rate and GDP variables. 
18 Despite of the correspondence with the appreciation of the Euro, it would be incorrect to 
interrelate this period with the non-positive 2003 and 2004 EMU estimates. The real 
exchange rate controls for any expenditure shift attributable to exchange rate movements. 
As an additional robustness check we also included different lags to account for a possible 
J-curve effect – without any change in the overall picture. For the impact of the Euro 
appreciation on trade, please see also a report by the European Commission (2007). 
19 This result is in contrast to a study by Maliszewska (2004), who finds – based on a 
POLS model – throughout positive impacts of the Euro. 
20 Please note that the growth effects due to the introduction of the Euro are long-run 
equilibrium effects and not annual growth rates. 
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Table 1: Estimation results with EMU dummy for the entire period (1998-
2004) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 POLS  FE  FEVD  HT 
Lngdpim  0.88*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 
 (0.04)  (0.11)  (0.00)  (0.10) 
Lngdpex  0.89*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 
 (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.07) 
Lrer -0.01  0.13**  0.13***  0.13*** 
 (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.04) 
Ldist -1.27***    -1.41***  -1.75*** 
  (0.11)  (0.00)  (0.16) 
Border -0.00    0.00***  -0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Ll -0.16*    -0.23***  -0.15 
  (0.10)  (0.00)  (0.13) 
Cl 0.23*    0.13***  0.01 
  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.15) 
Eu  0.08  0.03 0.03*** 0.03 
 (0.09)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.05) 
Ea  0.16*  0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 
 (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.05) 
Emu  0.13**  0.07** 0.07*** 0.07** 
 (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
Lavrer  1.22*** 0.45** 0.45*** 0.45** 
 (0.41)  (0.23)  (0.01)  (0.22) 
Lavdist 0.55***    0.93***  1.45*** 
  (0.15)  (0.00)  (0.23) 
Avborder 0.00***    0.01***  0.01*** -32- 
 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Avll -0.10***    -0.14***  -0.18*** 
  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.05) 
Avcl -0.02    -0.40***  -0.45 
  (0.26)  (0.00)  (0.34) 
Aveu  -0.74*** -0.22* -0.22*** -0.22* 
 (0.21)  (0.12)  (0.01)  (0.12) 
Avea  0.34  -0.07 -0.07*** -0.07 
 (0.23)  (0.11)  (0.01)  (0.10) 
Avemu  0.22*  0.69*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 
 (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.01)  (0.08) 
hc1 0.09***    0.10***  0.09* 
  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.05) 
hc2 0.00       
 (0.00)       
hc3  -0.18*** -0.03 -0.03*** -0.03 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
Observations  5262 5262 5262 5262 
R-squared  0.89 0.98 0.98 0.83 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Source: Own calculations. 
 -33- 
 
Table 2: Estimation results with yearly EMU dummies 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 POLS  FE  FEVD  HT 
Lngdpim  0.88*** 0.75*** 0.75***  0.75*** 
 (0.04)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.11) 
Lngdpex  0.90*** 0.75*** 0.75***  0.76*** 
 (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.07) 
Lrer -0.01  0.13**  0.13***  0.12*** 
 (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.04) 
Ldist -1.27***    -1.38***  -1.68*** 
 (0.11)    (0.00)  (0.16) 
Border -0.00    0.00***  -0.00 
 (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00) 
Ll -0.16    -0.20***  -0.15 
 (0.10)    (0.00)  (0.12) 
Cl 0.23*    0.15***  0.05 
 (0.12)    (0.00)  (0.15) 
Eu 0.06  -0.01  -0.01***  -0.01 
 (0.09)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.05) 
Ea 0.15  0.23***  0.23***  0.23*** 
 (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.05) 
emu1998  0.24*** 0.07*** 0.07***  0.07*** 
 (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
emu1999  0.24*** 0.05* 0.05***  0.05* 
 (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
emu2000  0.33*** 0.15*** 0.15***  0.15*** 
 (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
emu2001  0.25*** 0.16*** 0.16***  0.16*** 
 (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
emu2002 0.14**  0.07*  0.07***  0.07** -34- 
 
 (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
emu2003 0.01  -0.02  -0.02***  -0.02 
 (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.04) 
emu2004 -0.06  -0.07  -0.07***  -0.07 
 (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.05) 
Lavrer  1.14*** 0.47** 0.47***  0.48** 
 (0.41)  (0.23)  (0.01)  (0.22) 
Lavdist 0.54***    0.82***  1.29*** 
 (0.15)    (0.00)  (0.23) 
Avborder 0.00**    0.00***  0.01*** 
 (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00) 
Avll -0.10***    -0.13***  -0.17*** 
 (0.03)    (0.00)  (0.05) 
Avcl -0.01    -0.41***  -0.40 
 (0.26)    (0.00)  (0.33) 
Avemu 0.24**  0.63***  0.63***  0.63*** 
 (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.01)  (0.08) 
Aveu  -0.75*** -0.28** -0.28***  -0.27** 
 (0.21)  (0.13)  (0.01)  (0.12) 
Avea 0.30  -0.04  -0.04***  -0.04 
 (0.23)  (0.11)  (0.01)  (0.10) 
hc1 0.09***    0.09***  0.08* 
 (0.03)    (0.00)  (0.05) 
hc2 0.00       
 (0.00)       
hc3  -0.17*** -0.05 -0.05***  -0.05* 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
Observations  5262 5262 5262  5262 
R-squared  0.89 0.98 0.98  0.85 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Source: Own calculations. -35- 
 
Table 3: Overall EMU impact for the CEECs in 2004
a
 
Estimations based on  the full 
country sample 
Estimations based on non CEEC 
country sample (Out-of-sample) 
 in  %  in bns US$
b in %  in bns US$
b
Czech Republic  1.34 3.84  10.91  13.69 
Estonia  18.54 3.00 20.16 7.54 
Hungary  17.75 21.40 40.75 20.47 
Latvia  -21.59 -6.01 -19.93  -12.94 
Lithuania  -15.26  -5.68 -8.78 -6.54 
Poland  -34.24 -137.39 -19.00  -81.30 
Slovak Republic  -4.39 -3.10 11.21 4.26 
Slovenia  52.12 42.31 66.51 83.37 
a Table entries display the cumulated imports of the Euro area from a specific CEEC. 
b Differences = counterfactual scenario minus baseline scenario.  
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table 4: Spearman rank correlation between openness and EMU effect 
 Full  sample 
Full sample excl. 
CEECs (Out-of-
sample) 
2004  0.45 0.55 
1991-2004  0.54*** 0.54*** 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 





A.1 Variable definitions and sources 
 
Table A.1: List of variables 
Variable Definition  Source 
ijt M   Yearly imports of country i 
from country j 
OECD ITCS 
t j i Y ) (   Importer and exporter GDP (in 
current US$) 
UN NAMAD 
ijt re   Bilateral real exchange rate   UN NAMAD (nom. exchange 
rates), IMF IFS (producer price 
index) 
ij D   Great circle distance between 
the two countries of a trading 
pair  
CIA World Factbook (latitudes 
and longitudes), own 
calculations based on the 
harvesine formula 
ij LL   Dummy = 1 for one country and 
= 2 for both countries of the 
trading pair being landlocked 
CIA World Factbook 
ij B   Dummy controlling for the 
length of a common border 
CIA World Factbook 
ij CL   Dummy controlling for the 









Dummy = 1 for both countries 
of a trading pair being EMU, 




A.2 Econometric methods 
 
A.2.2 The Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition estimator 
 
The FEVD procedure estimates in the first stage a standard FE model by 
conducting a within-groups transformation,  
 
ijt ijt ijt X M ε δ ~ ~ ~
+ =                                           (A-1) 
 
which removes the bilateral effects  ij µ  and the time-invariant variables  . 
From this, one obtains the estimated unit effects 
ij T
ij µ ˆ , including all time-
invariant variables, the overall constant term and the mean effects of the 
time-varying variables. In the second stage,  ij µ ˆ  is decomposed into an 
explained part (by the observed time-invariant and rarely changing variables) 
and an unexplained part  ,  ij h
 
   ij ij ij h T + = λ µ ˆ .                          ( A - 2 )  
 -38- 
 
In the last stage, the full model including the residual   from stage 
two, but leaving out 
ij h
ij µ  is re-estimated using POLS.
22  
 
ijt ij ij ijt ijt h T X M ε υ λ δ α + + + + = ˆ                     (A-3) 
 
Hence, if the orthogonality assumption between the time-invariant 
variables and the unobserved bilateral effects is correct, the estimator is 
consistent.  
 
A.2.3 The Hausman and Taylor estimator 
 
By using instrumental variables to address the problem of correlation of the 
unobservable bilateral effects with some of the explanatory variables (as 
detected by the Hausman test), the estimator additionally allows controlling 
for potential endogeneity biases caused by RHS variables. In an RE model of 
the form 
 
ijt ij ij ij ijt ijt ijt T T X X M ε µ λ λ δ δ + + + + + = 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1                  (A-4) 
 
ijt X1  and   are   and  ij T1 1 1 k × 1 1 g ×  vectors of observations on exogenous 
variables and 
ijt X 2  and   are   and  ij T2 2 1 k × 2 1 g ×  vectors of observations on endogenous 
variables, causing a bias in the standard RE estimation. Hausman and Taylor 
(1981) therefore propose the use of information already contained in the 
model to instrument the endogenous variables. In the first step, the consistent -39- 
 
1 δ  and  2 δ  are used to obtain the within residuals. Regressing these on   and 
, using   and   as instruments, yields intermediate, even though 
consistent estimates of 
ij T1
ij T2 ijt X1 ij T1
1 λ  and  2 λ . With the two sets of residuals (within and 
overall) it is possible to estimate the variance components, which are used to 
perform the General Least Squares (GLS) transform. The model is identified 
as long as  . Since the estimator is consistent but not efficient, we 
correct at this stage the variance-covariance matrix by using standard errors 
that are robust to arbitrary autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The HT 
estimator is then obtained by 
2 1 g k ≥
 
ijt ij ij ij ijt ijt ijt T T X X M ε µ λ λ δ δ ( ( ( ( ( ( (
+ + + + + = 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1                 (A-5) 
 
using  ijt X1
~
,  ijt X 2
~
,  ijt X1 ,  ijt X 2  and   as instruments, where  ij T1 ω (
 represents the 
GLS transform of a variable, ω  stands for the within-groups mean and ω ~ for 
the within transform of a variable ω .  
The selection of variables included in   and   is not 
straightforward. We follow the proposition by Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
and use economic intuition.
ijt X 2 ij T2
23 First, and in response to the critique by Baldwin 
(2006a), we treat the dummy variables for membership in a preferential 
arrangement as endogenous, including the variable reflecting EMU 
membership. In reference to the possibility of export-led growth, a second 
source of endogeneity bias may stem from the exporter’s GDP variable. Its 
simultaneous instrumentation with the bilateral exchange rate variable 
improves the model so much that the over-identification test can no longer 
reject the null of a non-systematic difference between the FE and the HT -40- 
 
estimator ( ). However, we find that instrumenting the importer’s 
GDP variable improves the model further and fully eliminates the endogeneity 
bias.
56 . 1 ) 11 (
2 = χ
24   
 
A.3 EMU impact on Austrian imports from the CEECs in 2004 
 
Table A.3: EMU impact on Austrian imports from the CEECs in 2004 
 
 
Estimations based on  the full 
country sample 
Estimations based on non CEEC 
country sample (Out-of-sample) 
 in  %  in bns US$
a in %  in bns US$
a
Czech Republic  3.64%  0.66 25.74% 1.60 
Estonia  12.00% 0.04 26.04% 0.22 
Hungary  15.93% 0.88 52.91% 1.15 
Latvia  -24.15% -0.16 -14.40% -0.23 
Lithuania  -17.57%  -0.17 -1.85% -0.04 
Poland  -32.12%  -5.63 -8.36% -1.25 
Slovak Republic  -2.95% -0.12 24.78% 0.44 
Slovenia  60.56% 6.12 91.60%  10.27 
a Differences = counterfactual scenario minus baseline scenario.  









22 Also, at this third stage, a robust variance-covariance matrix is applied to eliminate 
panel heteroskedasticity.   























lim µ  cannot be rejected,  ijt X1 ij 1
ij
and T  are uncorrelated with the 
random effect µ  and no further instrumentation is needed. 
24 Since the instrumentation of the trade cost variables could not further improve the 
model, we treat the time-invariant HC1 variable as endogenous. 